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Wi-Fi networks have a very strong potential: They are easy to deploy, they use unlicensed
frequencies and they provide Internet connectivity that is several times faster than by cable
modem. However, two major problems still need to be solved: the lack of a seamless roam-
ing scheme and the variable quality of service experienced by the users. The reputation-
based solution presented in this paper solves both problems: It allows a mobile node to
connect to a foreign Wireless Internet Service Provider (WISP) in a secure way while pre-
serving its anonymity and it encourages the WISPs to provide the users with good QoS. We
analyze the robustness of our solution against various attacks and we prove by means of
simulations that our reputation model indeed encourages the WISPs to behave correctly.
We also propose a simple mechanism that allows the WISPs to predict the QoS they are
able to offer to the (mobile) clients.
I. Introduction
The rapid growth of WiFi networks over the past years
is due primarily to the fact that they solve several of
the intrinsic drawbacks of cellular data services such
as GSM/GPRS. These drawbacks are mainly the rel-
atively low offered bitrates and the slow deployment
of new features due to several factors such as the large
size and the oligopolistic behavior of the operators,
their willingness to provide homogeneous service, and
the huge upfront investment. Therefore, the deploy-
ment of wireless networks such as WiFi in unlicensed
frequencies makes it possible to envision a substantial
paradigm shift, with very significant benefits: much
higher bandwidth, deployment based possibly on lo-
cal initiative, higher competition, and much shorter
time-to-market for new features. This may, in turn,
pave the way for new types of services.
In recent years, wireless Internet service providers
(WISPs) have established thousands of WiFi hot spots
notably in cafes, hotels and airports. However, two
major problems still need to be solved. The first prob-
lem is the provision of a seamless roaming1 scheme
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1Note that by roaming we designate the operation of obtain-
ing service from different operators, and not the handoff between
access points (whether managed by the same provider or by two
different providers). The handoff problem is out of the scope of
this paper.
that would encourage small operators to enter into the
market. This is a fundamental issue for the future of
mobile communications. Indeed, without an appropri-
ate scheme, only large stakeholders would be able to
operate their network in a profitable way, and would
impose a market organization very similar to the one
observed today for cellular networks; one of the great-
est opportunities to fuel innovation in wireless com-
munications would be missed. The second problem is
the lack of a good quality of service guarantee for the
users.
This paper provides a response to these challenges.
By appropriately unbundling the major functions of
the network, our solution institutes a virtuous cycle of
deployment and usage: Each WISP will be encour-
aged to deploy its network and will be confident that
mobile users registered with other WISPs will pay for
the service it provides them; likewise, users will be as-
sured that the WISPs are under the scrutiny of all the
other users (including the roaming ones), and that they
will be informed about their degree of satisfaction.
As we will see, the solution is relatively simple,
provided that the roles of the different entities are
clearly defined. We describe these entities in detail,
along with the security protocols and the charging
mechanism. In order to facilitate user acceptance, the
proposed solution minimizes user involvement: once
the mobile device has been initialized, it can make all
decisions autonomously.
One of the major goals of this work is to build up
trust between mobile users and WISPs. For this rea-
son, we provide a detailed threat analysis and we show
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that the proposed protocols can thwart rational attacks
and detect malicious attacks (we define these terms in
Subsection III.B).
This paper is organized in the following way: In
Section II, we present the state of the art and in Sec-
tion III we present the system and trust models. In
Section IV, we give an overview of the proposed so-
lution and describe the details of the protocols. We
study the security of the protocols in Section V and
evaluate the overhead in Section VI. In Section VII,
the reputation system is evaluated by means of simu-
lations. Finally, we discuss the prediction the QoS in
Section VIII and we conclude in Section IX.
II. State of the Art
Reputation-based Systems: These systems are
mainly used to build trust and foster cooperation
among a given community. The efficiency of repu-
tation mechanisms has been widely studied in various
fields and with different approaches. Studies such as
[13], [23] and [24] consider the effect of online repu-
tation systems [9] on e-marketing and trading commu-
nities such as eBay. Reputation mechanisms are also
used to foster cooperation in peer-to-peer networks
[10] or in ad hoc networks [6, 19].
But, from all these studies, we cannot draw a clear
conclusion about the efficiency of reputation systems;
each of these mechanisms should thus be analyzed on
a per-case basis.
Roaming in WISPs: The deployment and success
of WiFi networks is slowed down by the lack of inter-
operability between WiFi providers (this is also called
the fragmentation problem [21]): A client that has an
account with a WISP A cannot connect to a hot spot
managed by a WISP B. This solution, however, is
changing and more and more WISPs are establishing
roaming agreements (similar to what is done for cellu-
lar networks). The roaming can be between providers
within the same country (e.g., T-Mobile and iPass in
the US) or on international scale (e.g., between the
British BT and the American Airpath).
Another solution would be to use the service of a
WiFi roaming operator such as Boingo Wireless [14].
Such an operator tries to solve the roaming problem
by having agreements with as many WISPs as possi-
ble. It then aggregates all the hot spots managed by
these WISPs into a single (seamless) network. How-
ever, Boingo does not consider the problem of the
variable QoS in WiFi networks.
In [22], Patel and Crowcroft propose a ticket based
system that allows mobile users to connect to foreign
service providers: The user contacts a ticket server
to acquire a ticket, requests a service from a service
server and uses the ticket to pay for that service. How-
ever, unlike the solution we present in this paper, the
authors of [22] do not question the honesty of the
service providers, i.e. they assume that the service
providers provide the users with a good quality of ser-
vice, which is far from being guaranteed in WiFi net-
works. The same problem exists in the solution pro-
posed by Zhang et al. [26].
In [11], Efstathiou and Polyzos present a Peer-
to-Peer Wireless Network Confederation (P2PWNC)
where the roaming problem is considered as a peer-
to-peer resource sharing problem. They propose a so-
lution where a WISP has to allow the foreign users
to access its hot spots in order to allow its own users
to connect to foreign WISPs’ hot spots. This solution
however presents the same problem as for [22], i.e.,
there is no guarantee of a good QoS provision.
In [3], we also considered the problem of interop-
erability between the WISPs and we used a reputa-
tion system to foster good QoS provision. But, the
solution proposed in [3] differs in two main points
from the solutions we present in [4] and in this pa-
per. The first difference is the trust model: In [3], we
consider that even if the home network H is itself a
WISP, it plays only the role of a home network and it
is trusted by all other parties; on the contrary, the se-
lected WISP S is considered to be rational (i.e., it can
cheat if it is beneficial). We think that this assumption
should be relaxed because H can be a home WISP
for some nodes but, at the same time, a foreign WISP
for other nodes; assuming that it will be rational and
honest at the same time is inappropriate. The second
difference is the definition and the evaluation of the
solution: Compared to [3], here we present the details
of the protocols, we offer a detailed security analysis
of the solution and we evaluate the reputation system.
Compared to [4], we added in this paper a section in
which we propose a mechanism that can be used by
the WISPs to predict the QoS they can offer to the
mobile nodes.
III. System and Trust Models
III.A. System Model
In this paper, we consider a mobile node (MN) that
wants to connect to the Internet via a neighboring hot
spot (i.e., a hot spot that is within its power range);
we assume the hot spot to be managed by a WISP that
we denote by S (see Figure 1). MN is affiliated with
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its home WISP2 H with whom it has an account and
shares a symmetric key kHM . We assume that all the
messages exchanged between MN and H go through
S, however, we ensure MN’s anonymity with respect
to a foreign WISP S (note that it is possible to have
S = H).
Figure 1: System model.
In our model, all WISPs are registered with the
trusted central authority (TCA) that creates for each
of them a public/private key pair and a certificate of
their public key and of their identity. We assume that
TCA’s public key is known by all other entities. In
a “grassroots” vision, TCA would be a federation of
WISPs, who join forces to centralize a few strategic
functions. In a more conventional vision, TCA can be
under the control of a world-wide organization such
as a quality control company, a certification company,
or a global telecommunications operator. TCA servers
can be distributed to avoid bottlenecks.
In this paper, we present a reputation based mecha-
nism that, on the one hand, allows MN to evaluate the
behavior of the WISPs and, on the other hand, encour-
ages the WISPs to provide the users with good QoS.
In our model, each WISP has what we call a repu-
tation record that represents an evaluation of its be-
havior and that is generated and signed by TCA. The
choice of the initial reputation record of a WISP is
discussed in Section VII.
III.B. Trust and Adversarial Model
We consider an attacker A that wants to perform an
attack against our protocols (see Section V for the list
of attacks). A can be a mobile node or a WISP. We
assume that (i) TCA never cheats and is trusted by the
other parties for all the actions it performs; (ii) the
WISPs (here S and H) are rational and therefore they
cheat (i.e., perform one of the attacks presented in
Section V) only if it is to their advantage (e.g., in terms
of money); and (iii) MN may be malicious and there-
fore it can cheat even if there is no gain from cheating
2The solution works even if H does not operate hot spots it-
self.
(this implicitly assumes that MN can also perform ra-
tional attacks). We also assume that MN trusts H to
manage its account and that several attackers can col-
lude and share information (possibly their secret keys)
to perform more sophisticated attacks.
Confidentiality of data is not an issue in our case, so
we do not consider passive attacks where the attacker
eavesdrops the data exchanges between two parties.
Note that this is an orthogonal issue that is easily ad-
dressed using standard security techniques.
We consider exclusively attacks performed against
the different phases of our protocols, meaning that we
do not consider other arbitrary attacks such as DoS
attacks based on jamming. However, we do design the
protocols with DoS in mind, making sure that we do
not expose protocol participants to unnecessary risks
by relying on heavyweight operations.
In this paper, we want to study the effect of ratio-
nal and malicious attacks on our set of protocols. Our
goal is to make sure that our solution thwarts ratio-
nal attacks, detects malicious attacks and, if possible,
identifies the attacker.
IV. Proposed Solution
IV.A. Rationale of the Solution
Our solution consists of four phases: Session Setup,
Service Provision and Payment, Session Closing and
Reputation Update.
Session Setup: When MN wants to connect to
the Internet, it contacts all the neighboring WISPs3
and selects the WISP S that presents the best offer.
The decision making is based, among other criteria,
on the reputation records of the WISPs (see Subsec-
tion IV.C.1). Then, MN and S establish a secure ses-
sion by setting up a symmetric key kMS .
Service Provision and Payment: This secure ses-
sion is divided into parts. During the i-th part, MN
sends a payment proof for the i-th part of the ser-
vice and S provides that part of the service. In or-
der to make sure that the mobile nodes pay for the
service they receive, we use a credit-based micro-
payment scheme: the PayWord scheme [25] (see Sub-
section IV.B.1).
Session Closing: At the end of the connection, the
session is closed and MN reports on the QoS it re-
ceived to TCA.
Reputation Update: TCA collects the feedback
about the different WISPs, updates periodically the
3Note that we refer to the access points using the identities of
the WISPs that are managing them.
Mobile Computing and Communications Review, Volume 9, Number 3, 2005 3
reputation records according to the collected informa-




As already mentioned in Section III, the payment
scheme we use in this paper is the PayWord scheme
[25]:
During the session setup, MN generates a long
fresh chain of paywords w0, w1, ..., wn by choosing
wn at random and by computing wi = h(wi+1) for
i = n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 0, where h is a one-way hash
function and n is the maximum number of payments
that MN can send to S during the session. Then, MN
reveals the root w0 of the payword chain (which is not
considered as a payword itself) to S, H and TCA.
During the secure session, MN sends (wi , i) to S
as a payment proof for the i-th part of the service. S
can easily verifywi usingwi−1 that is known from the
previous micro-payment or from w0 if i = 1.
At the end of the session, S sends the last payment
(w` , `) it received to H . H verifies the validity of w`,
pays S the amount corresponding to ` paywords and
charges MN for that amount by updating its billing
account.
We use this micropayment scheme because it al-
lows for an offline verification of the payment proofs
and because of its low computational and storage costs
for the mobile nodes.
IV.B.2. Authentication of MN by H
As stated in Section III, all communication between
MN and H goes through S. Therefore, in order to
preserve the anonymity of MN with respect to S, we
use the following authentication mechanism, which is
commonly used in the industry (e.g., SecurID [16]):
When MN gets affiliated with H , the two parties share
a random seed s that represents the input to a pseudo-
random generator. The output is a random number
tag that is 30 to 50 bits long. H keeps a small win-
dow (e.g., 50 entries) of upcoming tags for each mo-
bile node and maintains the pairs (tag; node’s identity)
in a sorted database. Upon receipt of a given tag, H
searches its database, retrieves the pair (tag;identity)
and identifies MN. In case of collision (i.e., more than
one pair contains the random number tag),H asks MN
to send the next tag value.
IV.C. Details of the Protocols
IV.C.1. Session Setup Phase
This phase consists of three steps (see Figure 2): Se-
lection of the WISP, Authentication of MN and Secure
session establishment.
Figure 2: Session setup
Selection of the WISP: When MN wants to obtain
Internet access, it scans the spectrum, contacts the
neighboring WISPs and asks for an offer by broad-
casting the following request message:
OfferReq = [ReqID ,nM ] (1)
where ReqID is the request identifier and nM is a
nonce generated by MN. Each WISP W willing (and
able) to provide service at that time responds by a
signed offer OfferW :
W → MN : OfferW ,SpkW (OfferW ,OfferReq) (2)
where
OfferW = [W ,RRW ,AQW ,PW ,Cert(W ),nW ]
RRW is the most recent reputation record of W
(signed by TCA), AQW is the QoS it advertises4, PW
is the price it is requesting for each part of the service
(see Subsection IV.C.2), pkW is its private key and
Cert(W ) is the certificate of its public key PKW .
For each offer OfferW , MN verifies the
freshness of nW and computes a value5
DecisionW = RRαW ·AQβW · P−γW , where the
exponents α, β and γ are parameters that depend
on the application MN is running6. Then, MN
determines DecisionS = maxW {DecisionW },
selects the WISP S and verifies its certificate and the
4The estimation of the QoS offered by W is discussed in Sec-
tion VIII.
5The decision function given here is an example; it can be any
function f (RRW ,AQW ,PW ).
6We can have for instance (α,β,γ)= (2,1,3) for chat applica-
tions to put the emphasize on low price offers and (α,β,γ)= (2,2,1)
for file transfer applications to put the emphasis on QoS. The deci-
sion function being exponential amplifies the difference between
these two cases.
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signature of its offer. If the verification is incorrect,
MN checks the second best offer and so on. We
denote the selected WISP by S.
Authentication of MN: Before starting the session,
S has to make sure that MN is a valid mobile node
that is registered with a valid home WISP. As we want
to preserve the anonymity of MN, the verification of
MN’s identity involves H and uses the authentication
mechanism described in Subsection IV.B.2. We have
thus the following messages exchanged:
MN → S : M = [H , tag ,nM
EkHM (MN ,S , tag ,nM )] (3)
S → H : S ,nS ,M,MACkHS (S ,M) (4)
H → S : TID ,EkHM (TID ,nM , kMS ),
EkHS (TID ,nS , kMS ) (5)
S → MN : TID ,EkHM (TID ,nM , kMS ) (6)
(3) MN sends to S a message M containing, in
clear, the identity of H , its current tag and a freshly
generated nonce nM . M also contains, encrypted us-
ing the symmetric key7 kHM , the identities of MN and
S, the tag tag and the nonce nM .
(4) S sends to H its identity, a freshly generated
nonce nS , the message M and a MAC computed on
both items using the key kHS .
(5) H searches its sorted database, identifies MN
using the tag sent in clear (as explained in Subsec-
tion IV.B.2), looks up the symmetric key it shares with
MN and uses it to decrypt the rest of the message.
Then, H re-checks the identity of MN (the identity
corresponding to the tag should also correspond to the
identity MN encrypted in the message) and verifies
that the WISP with which MN intends to interact is
indeed the WISP that sent the message.
If the message is not correct, H informs S that
MN is not affiliated with it by sending a negative ac-
knowledgement. If, on the contrary, the message ver-
ifies correctly, H generates a symmetric key kMS that
MN and S will use later as a session key (i.e., all the
messages exchanged between MN and S during the
session are secured using kMS ). Then, H constructs
a message containing (i) in clear, a fresh temporary
identifier TID for MN (TID will be used during ser-
vice provision), (ii) TID , nM , and kMS encrypted
using the symmetric key kHM , and (iii) TID , nS ,
and kMS encrypted using the symmetric key kHS , and
7H and S can use their public keys to establish a temporary
symmetric key kHS . We assume that this key is generated prior to
the execution of our set of protocols.
sends this message to S. H maintains a table contain-
ing the correspondence between the temporary iden-
tifiers and the identities of the nodes; given TID , H
can identify the correspondent MN.
(6) S decrypts EkHS (TID ,nM , kMS ), verifies that
the temporary identifier in the decrypted part corre-
sponds to the one sent in clear, and compares the
nonce in the decrypted part with the one generated
by MN. If these verifications are correct, S removes
EkHS (TID ,nM , kMS ) from the message and forwards
the rest to MN.
MN decryptsEkHM (TID ,nH , kMS ) and verifies the
temporary identifier and the nonce as S did. If every-
thing is correct, MN maintains TID in memory.
Note that if S = H , MN sends message (3) to H
and H responds with message (6).
Secure Session Establishment: MN generates
a long hash chain of n + 1 elements, com-
puted from a randomly chosen seed wn as de-
scribed in Subsection IV.B.1. Then MN generates
a contract C = [CID ,w0 ,RRS ,AQS ,PS ] where
CID = [TID ,S ,H ] is the contract identifier and w0
is the root of the hash chain.
Then MN and S inform H about the contract:
MN → S : C ,MACkMS (C ),MACkHM (C ) (7)
S → H : C ,MACkHM (C ),MACkHS (C ) (8)
(7) MN sends the contractC to S, together with two
MACs computed on C using the symmetric keys kMS
and kHM , respectively.
(8) S verifies C and MACkMS (C ) and if they are
correct, it computes a MAC on C using the symmetric
key kHS it shares with H . Then, S sends to H the
contract C and the MACs computed with kHM and
kHS . H verifies the MACs and, if they are correct, it
stores the contract C.
MN and S also inform TCA about the contract:
MN → S : EPKTCA(C , kMT ),
MACkMS (EPKTCA(C , kMT )) (9)
S → TCA : C ,EPKTCA(C , kMT ) (10)
TCA→ S : SpkTCA(C ),MACkMT (C ) (11)
S → MN : MACkMT (C ) (12)
(9) MN generates a fresh symmetric key kMT that
MN will use later to encrypt data for TCA (see Subsec-
tion IV.C.3). Then, MN encrypts8 C and kMS using
8In order to prevent the key retrieval by an attacker, MN can
use a probabilistic encryption algorithm, e.g. RSA-PSS [8], RSA-
OAEP [2], or ElGamal [12].
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the public key of TCA, computes a MAC on the data
using kMS and sends the encrypted data and the MAC
to S.
(10) S verifies the MAC and sends C and the en-
crypted data to TCA.
(11) TCA decrypts the data and compares the con-
tractC received in the encrypted data with the contract
received in clear from S. If they are identical, TCA
signs the contract C using its private key pkTCA,
computes a MAC on it using the symmetric key kMT
that is shares with MN, and sends the signature and
the MAC back to S. TCA also maintains C and kMT
in its local database.
(12) S verifies TCA’s signature and forwards the
MAC to MN.
IV.C.2. Service Provision and Payment
Figure 3: Service provision and payment
The session is subdivided into parts, depending on
the duration or on the amount of data exchanged be-
tween MN and S. During the i-th part:
MN → S : TID ,wi ,MACkMS (TID ,wi)(13)
S → MN : ith part of the service (14)
(13) MN sends to S its temporary identity TID, the
i-th PayWord wi and a MAC computed on both items
using the key kMS .
(14) S verifies the validity of wi by checking that
h(wi) = wi−1, where h is the one-way hash func-
tion used by MN to generate the chain. If it is cor-
rect, S provides MN with the i-th part of the service.
Note that the data packets corresponding to the i-th
service are cryptographically protected using the key
kMS (e.g., the key is used to encrypt the packets if
privacy is required and to compute a MAC if authen-
tication is required).
Figure 4: Session closing and the reputation update
IV.C.3. Session Closing and Reputation
Update
At the end of the session, S sends to H a payment re-
quest PR that contains, encrypted using kHS , the con-
tract identifier CID, the last hash value w` it received
from MN and the number ` of provided service parts.
PR also contains, in CID, the identity of S so that H
is able to retrieve the symmetric key kHS .
S → H : PR = [CID ,w`, `,MACkHS (CID ,w`, `)] (15)
Upon receipt of PR, H verifies the validity of w`
as explained in Subsection IV.B.1, retrieves the price
PS from the contract, rewards S for the ` parts of the
service, and charges MN. H is also remunerated (see
details in Subsection IV.D).
At the end of the session, MN generates a satisfac-
tion level message Sl as follows:
Sl = [EkMT (CID ,QoSEvalS ,CID ,w`, `)] (16)
QoSEvalS ,CID is MN’s estimate of the compliance of
the obtained QoS with the announced one and kMT is
the key MN shares with TCA.
Then, MN sends its satisfaction level to TCA:
MN → S : TID ,Sl ,MACkMS (TID ,Sl)(17)
S → TCA : S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl ,
SPKS (S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl) (18)
(17) MN sends to S its temporary identifier TID, Sl
data and a MAC computed on both items.
(18) S verifies the MAC. If it is correct, S generates
a message containing CID, w`, ` and Sl, signs it and
sends the message and the signature to TCA.
TCA verifies the signature and retrieves the key it
shares with MN (using CID). Then TCA decrypts Sl,
compares the CID, w`, ` in the encrypted data to those
received in clear from S and if they are identical, TCA
considers QoSEval as a valid feedback. Then TCA
informs H that it correctly received the feedback:
TCA→ H : Ack ,S ,CID ,SPKTCA(Ack ,S ,CID) (19)
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(19) H verifies the signature and retrieves the iden-
tity of MN (using CID). Then, H remunerates MN a
small amount of money ε, which is meant to encour-
age the mobile nodes sending the reports.
TCA collects the information about the satisfaction
levels for a given period and then, at the reputation
update time, it updates the reputation record of each
WISP, signs them and informs the WISPs about their
new records. The new reputation record depends on
the old one and on the collected information. An ex-
ample is given in Subsection VII.
TCA considers the absence of feedback as negative
feedback. Indeed, TCA knows that a session has been
established between MN and S and thatH is the home
WISP of MN (see Subsection IV.C.1). TCA is thus
waiting for the report from MN about its interaction
with S, and not receiving it within a “reasonable” time
is considered as bad feedback.
IV.D. Charging and Rewarding Model
In this subsection, we provide additional details re-
garding the charging and rewarding model:
• If, at the end of the session, MN moves away
from S (and therefore cannot send the feedback
via S), it is still possible for MN to report on
its satisfaction level to TCA via another WISP
W : W includes its identity in message (18) and
signs the message using its own private key. TCA
then verifies the signature and informs H in mes-
sage (19) about the identity of W . Then H gives
both MN and W a reward ε/2.
• At the end of the session, S sends to H the last
payment proof (w`, `) it received from MN. H
verifies the validity of the payword w`, charges
MN the amount X = PS ∗ ` corresponding to
the ` parts of the service and rewards S, us-
ing a well-established e-payment technique, the
amount9 X − ε. If TCA receives no report from
MN, ε is handled according to some policy (e.g.
it can be distributed to charity).
• The home network H is also remunerated. This
can be done e.g., if MN pays a flat monthly sub-
scription or if MN pays a specific amount per ses-
sion.
9As already mentioned in Subsection IV.C.3, ε is the reward
MN receives if it reports on its satisfaction level to TCA.
V. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our proto-
cols against various attacks against our protocols (see
Subsection III.B for the trust and adversarial model).
We identify eight attacks that are specifically targeted
against our solution: Publicity, Selective Publicity,
Denigration, Flattering, Report Dropping, Service In-
terruption, Refusal to Pay and Repudiation attacks.
We also consider more general attacks such as Packet
Dropping, Filtering and Replay attacks.
V.A. Specific Attacks
Publicity Attack: In this attack, S advertises a QoS
that is higher than the real QoS it can offer. As a re-
action, MN will send a negative report to TCA at the
end of the session. If this attack is repeated, the cu-
mulation of the negative reports will affect the future
reputation records of S. If on the contrary, this attack
is performed rarely, it will not affect much the reputa-
tion of S but S gains almost nothing from performing
this attack; as S is rational, it will not perform this at-
tack. The same reasoning holds if S=H with, in addi-
tion, the possibility for MN to punish H by choosing
another home WISP.
Selective Publicity Attack: In this attack, S at-
tempts to performs the Publicity attack with a specific
MN. However, the anonymity of the mobile nodes pre-
vents S (if S 6= H) from performing the Publicity at-
tack against a specific MN. The only possible selection
would be based on the home network (i.e., S performs
the Publicity attack with all the MNs affiliated with a
given home network). S gains nothing from this at-
tack and thus S will not perform it.
Denigration Attack: In this attack, MN receives a
good QoS from S but pretends the contrary by sending
a negative report or no report at all.
If no report is sent, H will not give MN the ε re-
ward and TCA will consider the absence of feedback
as negative feedback. Therefore, this attack is not ra-
tional for MN. Therefore, it is more interesting for MN
to send a negative feedback instead of not sending the
report at all: The effect of the attack is the same and
at least MN will get paid for the feedback. But this
attack is still not rational. Indeed, MN gains nothing
from sending a negative feedback instead of a positive
one (the cost of the sending remains the same). Such
behavior is thus purely malicious.
This attack is not harmful for the WISP, unless it
is performed systematically and by a high number of
colluding MNs. This attack is rational if the MNs be-
long to a competitor that wants to affect the WISP’s
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reputation. However, TCA can statistically detect it if
the following events happen frequently:
1. The MNs affiliated with H always pretend that
they received a bad QoS (i.e., lower than the adver-
tised QoS) from a given WISP, whereas many other
MNs report on a good QoS from that very WISP. As
the selective publicity attack is not possible, this sit-
uation is suspect and TCA may punish H , e.g., by
downgrading its reputation record.
2. TCA never receives reports from MNs affiliated
with H about the sessions they established with S.
Note that this attack comes with an important cost:
if an attacker A wants to alter the reputation of S by
parking misbehaving nodes close to the hot spots man-
aged by S, A should own many devices and devote
them to the attack. Note also that this colluding attack
may harm very small WISPs (with few hot spots) - if
the attacker pays the price - but it is much too costly
against WISPs with hundreds of hot spots.
Flattering Attack: In this attack, MN sends sys-
tematically a good feedback about S’s behavior to
TCA. This attack makes sense particularly if S = H;
it significantly improves the reputation of the targeted
WISP only if it is performed systematically and by
a high number of colluding attackers. The detection
mechanism can be similar to the one proposed for the
denigration attack. However, a specificity of this at-
tack resides in the fact that H can create “virtual”
MNs (i.e., MNs that have an account but are not nec-
essarily real devices), emulate connections with them
and make them systematically send positive feedback.
This leads to a cost that is much lower than the cost
of the denigration attack but TCA can detect it if (i)
the MNs affiliated with H rarely connect to foreign
WISPs (or at least much less than average) or if (ii) H
is not rewarded for the connections it established with
a high number of MNs affiliated with it (if we assume
that this information is available to TCA).
Report Dropping Attack: In this attack, MN sends
the report but S does not transmit it to TCA (e.g., be-
cause S expects a negative feedback). However, as
the absence of feedback counts as the lowest possible
feedback, this dropping does not help S: Assuming
that the feedback is defined between values minRep
and maxRep, not receiving the report corresponds to
a feedback of minRep. This attack is therefore not ra-
tional for S.
Service Interruption Attack: In this attack, S re-
ceives the i-th payment proof from MN but does not
provide the corresponding part of the service. MN will
then keep asking for it (by sending again the i-th pay-
ment). After a predefined number of retransmission
requests, MN will end the session, which prevents S
from providing more service parts (and thus earning
more money) and also affects the satisfaction level of
MN. If nevertheless, we want to prevent S from re-
ceiving the i-th payment without providing the i-th
service, we can use the solution proposed in [7].
Refusal to Pay Attack: In this attack, MN does
not send the i-th payment to S. Then, S will not pro-
vide the i-th part of the service and the session will
end (after a predefined number of retransmission re-
quests). This attack is then not rational: It prevents
MN from receiving the service part but does not harm
S.
Repudiation Attack: In this attack, S or MN re-
tracts the agreement it has with other party (e.g., S
asks for higher price than agreed upon when the con-
tract C was established). This attack is not efficient
because H and TCA receive the contract C from both
MN and S (Messages 8 and 10). The two copies
should be identical, otherwise TCA will not send the
message 11 and the session setup will not terminate.
Therefore, once the session is established, MN and S
cannot retract their agreement. To prevent S or MN
from sending incorrect information to H , we can also
require a response from H to establish the session.
V.B. General Attacks
Packet Dropping Attack: In this attack, A drops a
message it is asked to forward or discards a message
it is asked to generate and send. If this is done dur-
ing session setup, the secure session will not be estab-
lished. If A= MN (i.e., MN does not generate mes-
sages 1, 3, 7 or 9), it will not be able to connect to the
Internet but does not harm S. IfA= S , it will not pro-
vide the service to MN; MN will select another WISP
and S would lose an opportunity for revenue.
If during the secure session, the payment proof or
the part of the service is not generated or is dropped,
the entity that is waiting for it asks for retransmissions
(if needed several times). If it does not receive the
message, the session is closed.
If S does not forward the message Sl of MN, it
is equivalent to the denigration attack (see Subsec-
tion V.A).
If S does not generate the payment request and
sends it to H (Message 15), it will not get rewarded
for the service parts it provided to MN.
Filtering Attack: In this attack, A modifies a
packet it is asked to forward or generate. However,
the messages exchanged between the different parties
in our protocols are cryptographically protected, us-
ing MAC computations or digital signatures. There-
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fore, any modification of a message will be detected
at the receiver. Therefore, tampering with a message
is equivalent to not sending the message at all (an in-
correct message is discarded) and it is treated in the
same way (see the Packet dropping attack).
Replay Attack: In this attack, A replays a valid
message that was exchanged between two parties.
During session setup, the messages exchanged be-
tween the different entities (Messages (2) to (6)) are
protected using nonces; delayed messages are easily
detected and discarded.
During the secure session: the payment proofs and
the parts of the service arrive in sequence; a replay is
immediately detected and discarded.
During session closing, the payment request and the
satisfaction level (Messages (15, (17) and (18)) are
expected only once; a replay is immediately detected
and discarded.
VI. Overhead
In this subsection, we evaluate the computation and
communication overhead of our solution for a mobile
node. We consider only the mobile node because it
is the only entity that is severely ressource restrained
and because in this way we address all the wireless
aspects of the communications.
VI.A. Computation Overhead
During the different phases of our protocols, we use
symmetric and public key cryptography primitives to
secure the message exchange and to authenticate the
different parties involved in the communication. We
minimize however the use of public key cryptography,
especially by the mobile nodes, to reduce the compu-
tation cost.
Hence, MN uses public key primitives only for two
messages: it verifies the certificate, the signature and
the reputation of the WISP it selects (Message 2)
and it encrypts a message for TCA (Message 9). For
all other messages, MN uses symmetric cryptography
primitives: 5 + 2` MAC operations (` being the total
number of service parts), 2 encryptions and 1 decryp-
tion.
Public key operations are also used in the message
exchange between TCA and the two WISPs S and H
(Messages 11, 18 and 19). It is however possible to
convert them into symmetric key operations, if we as-
sume that S and TCA establish a symmetric key when
they first begin their interaction.
Note that the existence of a tamperproof hardware
at MN is not necessary for the good functioning of our
protocols, but it may be a good solution for protecting
the long term symmetric key kHM .
VI.B. Communication Overhead
Table 1 provides reasonable values of the size of the
different fields appearing in our protocol.
Field Name ReqID IDs nM ,pad wi `
Size (bytes) 4 16 20 20 2
Field Name MAC PK QoS, P, R k tag
Size (bytes) 16 150 1 16 6
Table 1: Size of the fields used in our protocol
ReqID is encoded on 4 bytes to reduce the risk of
using the same identifier for two different requests.
The identifiers of the WISPs and the nodes (W , H ,
S, MN and TID) are 16 bytes long (assuming an IPv6
format for example). The paywords wi are 20 bytes
long (e.g., assuming SHA) and the QoS (AQ and Qo-
SEval), the reputation R and the price P are encoded
on 1 byte each (which is enough to encode values be-
tween 0 and 100). The symmetric keys kHM , kHS ,
kMS and kMT are 16 bytes long (128 bits) and the
public keys are 150 bytes long (e.g., assuming RSA,
see [18]). We encode the nonces (nM and nW ) and
the pads on 20 bytes, the tag on 6 bytes (see Subsec-
tion IV.B.2) and the MACs on 16 bytes. Finally, we
use a sequence number ` that is 2 bytes long to support
long sessions.
We consider the example where MN is download-
ing a 1 MB file. We assume that the file is divided into
1 KB packets and each 50 packets represent a part of
service (` = 20 parts of service in total). Using the
values of Table 1, an end-to-end session between MN
and S represents an overhead, for MN, of 18337 bytes,
which represents an overhead per packet of around
18 bytes (i.e., less than 2% of the packet size).
VII. Reputation System Assessment
Our solution motivates the different players to partic-
ipate in the reputation mechanisms. Indeed (i) S is
motivated to provide MN with the QoS it promised
because otherwise the feedback of MN will be nega-
tive (see the analysis of the Publicity attack in Subsec-
tion V.A), (ii) MN is motivated to report on its inter-
action with S because it receives a refund ε and (iii)
S is motivated to forward the report (see the analysis
of the report dropping attack in Subsection V.A).
However, we want also to study the effect of the
reputation mechanism on the behavior of the WISPs,
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i.e., the QoS they effectively offer to the mobile users.
We therefore implemented our set of protocols using
the ns-2 simulator [15].
VII.A. Simulation Environment
We consider a static10 network of 5 WISPs, numbered
from 1 to 5, and 50 MNs. Each WISP is a home
WISP for 10 MNs. Each WISP W is characterized by
a triplet (AQW ,RQW ,PW ) where AQW is the QoS
advertised by W , RQW is the real QoS provided by
W and PW is the price W is asking for. We consider
that a WISP W is honest if it advertises the real QoS
it is offering (i.e., RQW = AQW ), misbehaving if it
advertises a QoS that is higher that the real QoS it is
offering (i.e., RQW < AQW ) and modest if it adver-
tises a QoS that is lower than the real QoS it is offering
(i.e., RQW > AQW ).
We initialize the reputation of the WISPs
to maxRR = 100 . At the end of each ses-
sion, MN sends to TCA its satisfaction level
Sl = [EkMT (CID ,QoSEvalW ,CID ,w`, `)], where
QoSEvalW ,CID = RQWAQW
Each simulation lasts for 50000 seconds and the
reputation updates are made every 2000 seconds. The
new reputation RRW (t + 1 ) of S is computed as fol-
lows:
RRW (t + 1 ) = λ · RRW (t) + (1 − λ) · feedbackWnbSW
where RRS (t) is the current reputation of W , nbSW
is the number of sessions established by W (and
already closed) during the last 2000 seconds and
feedbackW is the sum of all QoSEvalW ,CID received
over all these sessions (the absence of feedback is
considered as QoSEvalW ,CID = 0 ). λ represents the
“weight of the past” and is set to 1/2 in our simula-
tions.
Note that if S advertises a QoS that is lower than
the real QoS it offers (i.e., AQW < RQW ), we will
have QoSEvalW > maxRR, which may lead to a
new reputation that is also higher than maxRR. If
it is the case, TCA keeps RRW (t + 1 ) as it is in its
database but sends to S a new reputation record equal
to maxRR.
VII.B. Studied Scenarios
We want to study the reaction of the network to the co-
existence of honest, misbehaving and modest WISPs
in the network: WISPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 advertise
10All MNs are within the power range of all WISPs, it is there-
fore useless to consider mobility in this case.
AQ=60, 70, 80, 90 and 99, respectively; but all of
them offer RQ = 80. We assume that the values
of AQ and RQ remain constant and are independent
from the number of MNs that are simultaneously con-
nected to the WISPs11. We consider the two following
scenarios:
Scenario 1: All the WISPs ask for the same price12
P = 15. At the beginning of a simulation, we
assign to each MN, with equal probability, one of
the following applications: chat or file transfer.
Scenario 2: The WISPs ask for prices that are equal
to their QoSs (PW = AQW ). We expect the
choice of the application to have an effect on
the results, so we run 2 sets of simulations; one
where all the nodes run a chat application i.e., (α,
β, γ)= (2, 1, 3) and the other where they run a file
transfer application, i.e., (α, β, γ)=(2, 2, 1) (see
Subsection IV.C.1).
VII.C. Simulation Results
We run 10 simulations for each of the scenarios and
plot the average value. The results for Scenario 1
show that if all the WISPs ask for the same price, most
of the users select the WISP with the advertised QoS
that corresponds best to the real QoS it offers (WISP 3
in Figure 5). Due to their good reputation, modest
WISPs (here WISPs 1 and 2) perform better than mis-
behaving WISPs (here WISPs 4 and 5) but are still se-
lected much less often than the honest WISP. Indeed,
among the WISPs that have good reputations (WISPs
1, 2 and 3), WISP 3 is the one offering the best QoS
and thus is selected more often. Therefore, the best
strategy for the WISPs is to be honest.




























Figure 5: Results for Scenario 1.
The results for Scenario 2 show that almost all
the nodes that run the chat application (see Figure 6)
11The case where these values vary is studied in Section VIII.
12MN selects the WISP according to the decision formula pre-
sented in Subsection IV.B.2. In this formula, if all the WISPs ask
for the same price, the weight of the price parameter is the same
for all WISPs. The value assigned to the price is therefore not
important; we arbitrarily set it to 15.
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choose WISP 1, which asks for the lowest price and at
the same time has a very good reputation. The major-
ity of the nodes running a file transfer application (see
Figure 7) choose WISP 3 because it offers the best
real QoS: Therefore, WISPs offering different QoSs
can co-exist in the same network because nodes with
different needs (i.e., different α, β and γ coefficients)
choose different WISPs.




























Figure 6: Results for Scenario 2 (chat).




























Figure 7: Results for Scenario 2 (file transfer).
VIII. Prediction of the QoS Offered
by the WISP
The results of Scenario 1 show that the WISPs are en-
couraged to be honest. However, this requires each
WISP to accurately “predict” the QoS it can offer to
its clients. This prediction depends on several param-
eters such as the number of neighboring WISPs, the
number of clients that are simultaneously connected
in the neighborhood, the clients’ arrival rate, etc.
In this section, we propose the following sim-
ple prediction mechanism that consists of three main
steps: (i) the estimation of the number of clients ex-
pected in the network during the next period of time,
(ii) the computation of the total throughput expected
in the network during the next period of time, and (iii)
the definition of the prediction strategy.
VIII.A. Estimation of the Number of
Clients
During this phase, a WISP W has to estimate, for the
next period of time, the number of mobile clients that
will be served in its neighborhood. This estimation
has to take into consideration three main parameters:
(i) The length of the estimation period, i.e., the pe-
riod of time for which the estimation is done (e.g., the
next 15 minutes, the next hour).
(ii) The period of the day (e.g., peak hours, etc.)
or of the year (e.g., working day, week-end, holidays,
etc.) during which the estimation period is consid-
ered. This parameter gives an idea about the expected
traffic.
(iii) The length of the history maintained by the
WISPs. Indeed, while it operates, each WISP main-
tains the history of the number of clients simultane-
ously served in the neighborhood, the duration of the
connections, the clients’s arrival rate, the duration of
the connections, etc. A longer history leads to a better
estimation.
VIII.B. Computation of the Total
Throughput
During this phase, W computes the total throughput
expected in the network during the next estimation
period. This value can be computed using the num-
ber of clients simultaneously served in the neighbor-
hood (estimated in the previous phase) and Bianchi’s
throughput performance evaluation formula [5] (see
Figure 8).






















Figure 8: The total throughput obtained using Bianchi’s
throughput performance evaluation formula [5]. Bianchi’s
throughput is very close to the throughput we get by means of
simulations.
VIII.C. Definition of the Prediction
Strategy
Each WISP considers the value of the total through-
put computed during the previous phase and decides
the QoS it will advertise and to what extent it wants to
“overbook” itself. The efficiency of a given strategy
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depends on several parameters such as the duration
of the connections and the clients’ arrival rate. We
cannot compare these strategies as they may perform
differently in different circumstances: A strategy that
performs well in case of short and frequent connec-
tions may perform poorly when the connections be-
come long and sporadic. Therefore, the WISPs may
consider using different strategies according to the sit-
uation.
IX. Conclusion
In this work, we describe a simple solution that en-
ables a mobile node to connect to a foreign WISP in
a secure way while preserving its anonymity and en-
couraging the WISPs to provide the mobile users with
a good QoS. Our solution takes into account the fact
that the mobile clients are resource restrained mobile
device and therefore have much less computing and
storage resources than TCA, H or S.
We have analyzed the robustness of our solution
against different attacks and we have shown that our
protocols thwart rational attacks, detect malicious at-
tacks and can help identify the attacker.
We have proved by means of simulations that the
WISPs are encouraged to provide the MNs with a
good QoS and, at the same time, discouraged from
advertising a QoS that is different from that they can
really offer.
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